Showing posts with label experience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label experience. Show all posts

Sunday, 12 June 2022

Voice Recording: Belyea Rd 3

 Starting points:

"Mind" is very complex but we know more than nothing about it. We need to reconcile this with the idea that the "mind" is fundamentally mysterious. How do we add all we know to the "Zen" experience?

Why do we do what we do? What are the influences on our behavior? 

No obligation to follow "zen" or some "zen master" theories about experience itself and the mind.


Monday, 10 January 2022

Your Brain is a Virtual Reality Machine

 


Our ability to experience "virtual" worlds is not something new. Evolution has provided it as basic equipment along with our opposing thumbs. It's not a bug. It's a feature.

On the most fundamental level, we are constantly experiencing the future and the past: the flow of time. This ability is essential to what we call purposeful behavior. We love to debate whether or not other animals have this ability and to what degree, but it's clear that we have it in spades. It is essential to who we are as humans.

I am fascinated by how the brain produces the virtual world that we call "consciousness". It turns out to be quite a trick.

  • Sense information arrives at different times. For example, sound and smell arrive with very little processing, but virtual information goes through massive complex analysis. Yet we experience it all at the "same time".
  • We experience the decision to move after the brain has sent signals to move.
  • Our experience slightly precedes what is going on in the real world - it is a prediction of what is happening. In the words of the Great One: I skate not to where the puck is but where the puck will be.
Careful observation of the phenomenon we call "consciousness" provides endless examples of how we are constantly bombarded with stunningly immersive "virtual" experiences. The smell of apple pie. The voice of a loved one on the phone. A spider crawling on our leg. Our brains instantly and effortlessly supply "virtual" senses to "enhance" the smallest trickle of "real" data.

On top of this, we structure reality into stories and "explanations". We are the story-telling ape. The good stories are embellished and handed on over generations, eventually knitting themselves into systems called "mythology" and "religion". We are quite willing to believe that we live on after death or that there is an old man in the sky behind everything that happens. We love our stories so much that we forget they are "just" stories.

Our brains are made to be fooled. We don't need computers to be plunged into an alternate reality. We can open a book and read: "Call me Ishmael" and suddenly we are whalers. We read "In the beginning" and we walk in the garden with Adam and Eve. If I may be allowed to speculate a bit, it seems that hearing these words rather than reading them creates a more powerful image. In the words of Bishop Pike: "What is too silly to be said can be sung". This points out one essential feature of how we experience virtual worlds: sometimes simplicity is an asset. And worlds that provide auditory input (especially speech) are readily accepted as real. We experience merely visual "worlds" (like a photograph) as "representation" but we are not "immersed".

Finally, in passing, I should note that virtual worlds created by written text must depend on the skill of the reader. Evolution does not provide this skill. It is learned. People vary in their ability to acquire this skill. Similarly, people vary in their ability to be "immersed" in virtual worlds. To some, the computer-generated worlds of VR remain cartoons. To others, they are instantly "real".

Modern "Virtual Worlds", if they are interesting at all, involves a learning curve that can be almost as daunting as learning to read. This aspect of things is often overlooked by prophets of the "metaverse". People are too lazy, preoccupied, or busy to learn a VR application that is more complicated than, say, Zoom. Those who developed VR "superpowers" will always be a tiny minority.

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P.S. "A Thousand Brains" provides a deep and powerful framework for understanding how the brain creates the rich experience we call consciousness. In particular, it doesn't make a lot of difference where the sensations are coming from. Whatever we know about the real world (in a deeply recursive way) is applicable to another "world" where the sensations are coming from, say, a computer screen.

Thursday, 15 November 2018

Thoughts on Religion vs. Reality

For the moment, let me talk about the world of human experience as "E".

The world that Science investigates is assumed to exist apart from human experience, although we can only know it through human experience. Without really thinking about it, we imagine the "real world" to be about the shared experience: verifiable, consistent and augmented by what we call "reason". But we have long admitted that Universe, which I will call U, is not the same as "E". In fact, we assume that we can never know "U" entirely, directly or completely.

We all know that "E" is not the same for each of us. In fact, it is quite remarkably different between different cultures and different times or even for a single individual throughout his or her lifetime.

The question at hand is, is there anything "out there" apart from E and U?

In most religious traditions the answer is "yes".  Most religions postulate a universe in which the individual "soul" - the most important part of E  - exists apart from the individual physical body and survives death into a realm that may or may not is occupied by spirits, gods, occult forces and a whole world. Christianity specifically claims that the "soul" always exists apart from the body - an idea that appears in modern Science Fiction in many forms. Mystical traditions claim that some varieties of E (mystical experience) perceive alternate universes or perceive U directly, whatever that may mean. At least in the early days of the "drug culture", drugs like LSD were seen as a means of exploring that alternate reality - not just a way of bending the brain out of shape.

Religions also tend to assume that there is a moral universe that exists beyond the world of mere mortals but applies in some way to the moral choices we make. For example, the fate of our souls depends on the moral choices we make. In such a moral universe, the concept of "free will" is an essential attribute of the soul. If we have no free will, the entire idea of merit and reward beyond death (or even in this world) makes no sense. Religious apologists are well aware of this problem - frequently claiming that in a world without God (or their religion), morality cannot exist.

But if we stick to the evidence available, we are forced to conclude that our minds and therefore all of E are happening between our ears and are therefore embedded in U, like the rest of our bodies. There is no other Universe. Mind, like gravity, however mysterious, is a phenomenon within U.

One of the most impressive bits of evidence for this is the structure of the brain. Brain structure heavily contributes to "character" in the sense that lesions, injuries, tumors, and drugs can dramatically alter moral behavior. What we consider to be "moral" choices - the ones that supposedly chart the progress of the soul - are the work of identifiable brain structures.  If you break down "free will" into components, you wind up with faculties (brain structures, processes and systems) that may or may not work as expected. These faculties may fail individually or in combination as a consequence of specific injury to specific brain systems. For moral decisions to take place:
  • You need to be aware of the alternatives for action;
  • The alternatives need to be emotionally "tagged" - some "feel" better than others - otherwise you don't care;
  • You need to access applicable memory and social "rules";
  • You need to feel things like disgust, lust, shame, pride, and empathy;
  • You need to be able to hold all this in working memory long enough to work out an action;
  • You need to be able to act according to your mental "computation" (many people "know" what is right but behave in alarming, self-destructive ways anyway).
Drastic departures from "normal" capabilities in these areas are labeled with morally-tinged "disorders" such as psychopathy or even mild character judgments such as "laziness" or "impulsiveness". We are just beginning to understand the physical roots of these personality patterns. The field of psychological neurology is gradually stripping away our common sense idea that "bad" people are acting out of free choice - making "bad choices". What's left is a view that "normal" people make "normal" choices using "normal" brain structures. There is no room left for the idea that morality is something that exists outside of E (what we experience) and our bodies (part of U). We may need to toss wickedness onto the same scrap heap as demon possession.

Brain structures are stunningly complex in a way that shouts "design". Of course, we put aside the "Santa's Workshop" view of this "design". There is no "designer". But what then? We must say that our brain structures are a result of strong evolutionary pressure.

Our nervous systems extract an astonishing amount of detail from basic sensory information. To cite just one example, there are 20 different types of ganglia in the visual system. These nerve cells extract the "analog" information coming in from the retina. Each type of ganglion "speaks its own digital language" to the deeper structures of the brain. At the moment, we have a vague idea what five of these ganglion types are "talking about". What the others are "saying" remains mysterious. In no case are we in a position to decipher the language that each type speaks.*

There are hundreds of different cell types in the hippocampus - the brain area critical to memory. The complexity of this design is several orders of magnitude beyond anything that has come out of human design efforts. What is motivating this incredible process? It can be nothing but what we call R. The "real world". Our brains are embedded in R and they are a direct consequence of phenomena in R. Specifically, evolutionary "pressure" from events in R have consequences for even subtle differences in the design of our bodies - especially our brains. This applies to the way our brains make "moral" choices. There is no particular need for us to know what these "pressures" are. For example, we have been breathing for millennia before we discovered oxygen.

Evolutionary "pressure" is "adaptive", or "survival of the fittest". But for humans, survival depends on acting together with other humans. Great sections of the brain are specifically devoted to this job, including obvious things like speech but even more sophisticated "circuitry" that computes socially acceptable behavior - that's what we call "morality".

The main business of religion is to help us "compute" our behavior in socially acceptable ways. Religion is the result of many brains "computing" general solutions to the problems of existence, especially existence together with other humans.

We are left with a view of the world and our role in it that departs significantly from virtually all religions, but, at the same time, tells us why we have religions and why there is no particular reason for them to "make sense":
  • There is no "soul" apart from the body. Consciousness - and all the mysteries of the self - are created by the brain. The "self" can be disassembled bit by bit or ultimately destroyed by injury to the brain. The fact that we can't "explain" this does not put the phenomenon in a special category. We have no ultimate explanation for anything at all - including gravity.
  • "Free will", if it exists at all, is severely constrained by the details of our individual brain structure and health.  Wild departures from "normal" - such as psychopaths - have brain abnormalities not much different from being blind from birth. We must challenge our common-sense idea that others may be regarded as fundamentally "good" or "bad" in some absolute sense. 
  • With no "soul" or independent realm that dictates moral choices outside of our minds, the need for anything like "heaven" or "god" vanishes. As Pascal famously noted: "We have no need for that hypothesis".
But does the need for religion itself vanish? Our brains are designed to depend heavily on the input from other brains. To cite a simple example, our courts could not function without laws. Laws could not exist without language and the deep history behind the moral "computations" performed by cultures over the centuries. The fact that different cultures compute different answers to the moral problems presented does not diminish the fact that individuals are not "designed" to make moral choices entirely on their own.

It does seem possible for these insights to inspire something that looks like "morality". For example, perhaps we should back off from our natural tendency to regard people with different moral standards as "evil". Perhaps we should be more skeptical of ideas like deliberation and willfulness in those who offend against our laws. Perhaps we need to re-think our ideas of "justice" entirely - especially when it comes to our systems of punishment and reward that supposedly motivate people to behave in the "right" way. It seems to me that people who accept compassion as a core religious belief are already close to accepting this attitude for simple "scientific" reasons. It is a simple, verifiable fact that E is a creation of the human mind in response to the "real" pressure from R plus our efforts to survive in partnership with others (also playing itself out on a stage in R).

The vast majority of the human race believes or acts "as if" their own cultural standards of morality are absolute and not "invented" by "mere" humans. We want to think that their worldview is not "merely" mythical but in some sense reflecting a special insight into the nature of reality, usually augmented by some kind of "supernatural" (not part of U) history. I don't think it is too much of a leap for such people to accept that their worldview is a special case of "E". Other worldviews - even conflicting worldviews - need to be understood as fundamentally human and not uniquely valid conclusions of the nature of reality. For the individual, morality boils down to what we should do - here and now, in this world. Practical experience tells us that it's quite possible for folks with utterly different worldviews to agree on a wide range of common action.

On the other hand, it should be possible for us to deny "supernatural" justifications for actions that cast others as "evil" - deserving suppression or even death.

It's not too much to ask.

* More on visual system ganglia and the "big picture" posed by the brain here.

Monday, 22 August 2016

Daniel Dennett and His Intuition Pumps

Dennett's "Intuition Pumps" has inspired me, at last, to write a book. Maybe. I'd call it "Better Intuition Pumps" (BIP).

Dennett's book is a lovely "intuition pump" in its own right, but it cries out to be rewritten, refuted or at least challenged.

In other posts, I'll flesh out possible chapters in BIP, but I can outline some main points here.

Dennet champions as "Scientific" discipline for the study of mind, which he calls heterophenomenology "H". The idea is that anything important about the mind can be learned from the "outside", through experiments, interviews etc.  The data "H" works with is the set of observable, documented "observations" along these lines.

My problem with H is that it doesn't actually study the mind. Dennett is making the assumption that the mind is, for all intents and purposes, the brain. But one would think this is exactly what he needs to prove.

"Pumps" sets up a false alternative. Either the mind is the brain or the mind is something "inside" the brain or somehow associated with the body, like a "soul" or "homunculus". Why are those the only alternatives?

His mistake seems to be assuming his conclusion. To escape this mistake, we need to take a closer look at what a "mind" is. I happen to have one that we can examine as closely as time permits. Mine.

Here is the first "Better" Intuition pump. Consider the "mind", M, to be identical to the first-person experience of the Universe. This makes no assumption about the brain or, for that matter, a "soul". Moreover, we can use H techniques to investigate this mind in as much depth as we wish.

My discussion of M will show that it is not possible, even in principle, to determine anything of interest about M using H. In particular, H studies brains not minds.

A second BIP is the "Xombie". This is related to Dennet's "philosophical Zombie", a fascinating creature that is identical in all respects to a human being except he lacks the experience of being human. There is "nobody home". If you think that such a being is impossible, you are, according to Dennet, a victim of the "Zombie Hunch". You think that there must be something other than what shows "from the outside". Dennet challenges the reader by saying that this is "just a hunch" and needs proving. Otherwise, the default view is H, which assumes that we can never tell the difference between a Zombie and a person with "real" experience of the world.

I hold that Dennet's Zombie is interesting only in a rather trivial way, by proposing a way to "build" a Zombie in a particular way - a Xombie. The difference between a Xombie and a Zombie is that we specify in principle how the Xombie manages to "fake" consciousness. In summary, we imagine a robot that is exposed to he totality of human experience of the world from "birth". The Xombie can fake having a "mind" because we maintain that the mind itself is M, the totality of first person experience of the Universe. Thus, our Xombie is, by definition, "conscious".

Then, the question boils down to whether we could, in principle, actually build such a robot. This question veers of into what we might call "garden variety philosophy" as we look into things that make up an "M-like" mind but may be hard to implement, even in principle. Here are a few things in my mind that may be hard to implement:

  • I know that fish don't wear hearing aids
  • I may mistakenly believe that Napoleon was King of Spain
  • I don't understand the math of General Relativity and I know I don't
My suspicion is that the "boundary" between the known Universe of M and the "known unknowns", the "unknown unknowns" and so forth may be hard to model.

IBM's "Deep Blue" tells us that such things may not be as hard as they look.

But of course, we are still left with the suspicion that our robot doesn't have a real experience of the world. He has no real "first person" - he just fakes it. But at least we have a better idea of what he's faking: a deep, intimate, long-term relationship with the Universe. In other words, the Universe itself plays a large (perhaps indispensable) role in a "mind". The brain is just a detail.

There are other things to say about H. What, exactly, are the "results" of H - the theories, generalizations and hypotheses that make H a "Science". A Science is not just a menagerie of curious phenomena. What is H about? If H leaves out what I regard as the most important aspect of M (the Universe), what is it studying? My position is that you can't make generalizations about "minds" because they are by definition unique. Any generalization you make will be about brains, "typical" human behaviour etc. Is it really meaningful to talk about what people on average claim to experience? Haven't you left the baby out with the bath water?

A simple example can suffice. Ask our subjects to describe the first time they made love. It's hard to imagine that that all the "H-data" in the world would come close to "investigating" the real, personal experience of the individual, which is, after all, what we are supposed to be investigating.

I'm sure Dennet is familiar with this objection, but I'm not sure he is aware that there are an infinite number of objections like this. In fact, the infinite "space" of M is precisely the most impressive feature of M itself. This "space" can be explored by H, but such an exploration leaves theories of the brain far behind.

Another BIP is "Object Oriented" design (OOD), which would replace Dennet's lame chapter that tries to explain how computers work.  OOD explains everything about computers from the microscopic structure of memory to the emergent structure of the group mind - the Internet - and everything in between. It is perhaps one of the most powerful set of memes ever invented. It as a subset of human language that has he advantage of being totally unambiguous and "mappable" to the "real world". With OOD in hand, one can ask interesting questions about how the Internet acquires something like an M-type mind. OOD can be used to explore complexity and emergent phenomena.

Another BIP comes from self-organizing structures, which would complement Bennett's chapter on the game of Life. Besides being built entirely out of OOD components, the Internet is also self-organizing. 

So, computers and the Internet are worth including as "imagination pumps" in their own right.

It would be worth discussing whether a living thing is "sorta" an OOD creation. I'd say it's not and the differences may turn out to be fundamental - in other words, it may be impossible to build a carbon-based living thing following only OOD principals. If true, this would be hugely interesting. There seem to be serious problems with any attempt to "model" living cells, organelles, synapses and tissues using OOD ideas. These also happen to reveal some objections to the idea that a living thing is, in some sense, a "machine". Does this mean that there is some fundamental obstacle to building a machine mind.

Finally, Denett's books tend to present a rather simplified view of the brain. His "neurons" and "genes" are almost mythical creatures, no much different from demons. They are philosophical constructions - "memes", with almost all real behavior of brain tissue left out. What do we learn when we introduce real brain structures into Dennet's discussions? Is there a simplified version of the real brain that could serve as an "imagination pump"? Would it be useful to keep in mind that Dennet's discussions that seem to talk about the brain, using words that seem to refer to real things may trick us in the same way that Astrology tricks us by talking about real stars?

There seem to be quite a few publications around that describe real brain function. Worth a look. At first glance, we see a lot of OOD-based concepts.